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Any changes? The future agenda of Sweden’s security policy
Justyna Gotkowska
Sweden’s annual security and defence conference, which this year focused on the future of 
the country’s security policy, was held in Sälen on 12-14 January. It was attended by almost all 
the leaders of Sweden’s ruling and opposition parties. The discussions have revealed whether 
and how the mindset of the Swedish elite has changed following the heated debates on de-
fence issues in 2013. The opposition parties (Social Democrats, the Green Party, and the Left 
Party), which are likely to form a coalition government after the election to the Swedish par-
liament in September 2014, were given the opportunity to present their own priorities. The 
discussions have brought to the surface conflicting perceptions within the political elite con-
cerning the threats and challenges to Swedish security, and divergent positions on the future 
direction of the country’s security and defence policy.
It is highly likely that, due to a coalition compromise, the current course of Sweden’s security 
policy (namely, a policy of non-alignment along with close co-operation with NATO) will be 
maintained following the parliamentary election, albeit with new “leftist” influences (a gre-
ater involvement in the United Nations). Big changes that could lead to a significant streng-
thening of Sweden’s defence capabilities, or a decision on NATO membership, are not likely. 
Paradoxically, polls suggest that in the long run a more radical change in Stockholm’s security 
policy may be shaped by a gradual, bottom-up evolution of public opinion on the issue.
Context: A turbulent 2013
In 2013, Swedish politicians, military experts, and 
even public opinion, took part in the most heat-
ed debate on security and defence since the end 
of the Cold War. The discussions were precipitat-
ed by a series of events that, in the eyes of many 
experts, have seriously undermined the govern-
ment’s current security and defence policy and 
the related reform of the Swedish Armed Forces. 
This policy has been based on the perceived ab-
sence of conventional threats to the military se-
curity of the European countries - characteristic 
of early 21st century thinking. This threat percep-
tion led many European governments to focus 
on tackling the challenges posed by globalisa-
tion (namely, those resulting from social, politi-
cal and economic processes as well as from cli-
mate change, rather than addressing the actions 
of state actors). Also Sweden began to actively 
participate in an international crisis management 
policy - all the while maintaining its non-aligned 
status (that is, remaining outside military alliances 
and freely adapting its policies during wartime). 
As a result, Sweden reduced its defence budget 
and the number of the military; it also abolished 
conscription, and adapted the armed forces 
for participation in foreign missions - although 
this has limited Sweden’s defence capabilities 
at home. Following the Russian-Georgian war, 
which had triggered security concerns across the 
Nordic and the Baltic Sea regions, Swedish secu-
rity policy was augmented in 2009 by the adop-
tion of a unilateral political declaration of “soli-
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darity” (Sweden vowed not to behave passively 
in the event of a disaster or armed attack on any 
EU or Nordic country, and would expect these 
countries to reciprocate). In addition, Sweden in-
creased its military cooperation with the Nordic 
countries and NATO, but also pressed ahead with 
the plan to gradually transform its armed forces 
into an expeditionary force.
In early 2013, the Supreme Commander of the 
Swedish Armed Forces stated that in the event 
of a limited armed attack Sweden would be able 
to defend itself for no more than one week. 
This led to a series of heated public debates. In 
the context of increased uncertainty in the Nor-
dic and the Baltic Sea regions, which stemmed 
primarily from the reform and modernisation 
of the Russian Armed Forces and their military 
exercises in the region, the statement sent a po-
litical shock wave across Sweden. In April 2013, 
it was disclosed that the Russian Air Force had 
carried out an exercise near the Swedish bor-
der, which simulated an attack on two military 
targets in Sweden. Crucially, it was revealed 
that the Swedish fighter aircraft tasked with 
protecting the country’s airspace on duty at the 
time failed to respond. In December 2013, the 
Swedish National Audit Office (Riksrevisionen) 
published a scathing report on the MoD’s re-
form of the Armed Forces. The report highlight-
ed inadequate staffing levels, and a shortage 
of armament and military equipment. It also 
warned that the Swedish Armed Forces were 
unable to both ensure credible defence capabil-
ities at home while engaging in crisis manage-
ment abroad. The conclusion reached was that 
the military is unable to achieve the objectives 
of the reform introduced in 2009.
Differences in the assessment 
of security threats and challenges  
The conference in Sälen has shown that the 
discussions started in 2013 have only partially 
influenced the views of the Swedish political 
parties and that there remains substantial di-
vergence in their assessment of the threats and 
challenges to Swedish security.
The differences are particularly evident among 
the parties forming the current coalition - the 
Moderates, the Liberals, the Christian Demo-
crats and the Centre Party. The Moderates - who 
before coming to power were seen as the par-
ty most interested in security issues and NATO 
accession - are now more concerned with the 
consolidation of the state budget than with de-
fence matters. For Frederik Reinfeldt - Sweden’s 
Prime Minister and leader of the Moderate Party 
- the threats and challenges to Sweden’s securi-
ty are linked primarily to globalisation (including 
terrorism, transnational organised crime, cyber 
attacks). Although he agrees that Russia’s au-
thoritarian tendencies and its desire to control 
the neighbouring region are indeed worrying, 
he argues that cooperation within the EU and 
NATO makes military threats to the security of 
any of the member states highly unlikely. Conse-
quently, the Moderates believe that the current 
security policy is adequate and should be con-
tinued. Their two smaller coalition partners, the 
Christian Democrats and the Liberals, however, 
hold a different view. They consider the current 
political situation in Russia, coupled with Mos-
cow’s imperialist policy in the region, to be the 
most important reference point for Sweden’s 
security policy and for the reform of the armed 
forces. The two parties have therefore called for 
measures which would strengthen the military 
(and the civilian) capabilities to defend the coun-
try and to resist external pressure, to “reform” 
the current reform of the Swedish Armed Forces, 
and to increase the defence budget. They have 
also identified the specific regions of the country 
(Stockholm, Gotland, Blekinge/Skåne, Sweden’s 
The debates held in 2013 have only par-
tially influenced the views of the political 
parties in Sweden; they differ in their as-
sessment of threats and challenges.
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western coast), which, due to their significance 
for the functioning of the Swedish state and for 
control of military operations in the Baltic Sea re-
gion, may be particularly vulnerable in the event 
of a crisis or a conflict in this part of Europe. 
The left-wing opposition appears more unified 
in their assessment of the threats and challeng-
es, although their position is at times some-
what inconsistent. Stefan Löfven, the leader of 
the Social Democrats (who is expected to be-
come Sweden’s next prime minister), focuses 
primarily on security in the economic and social 
sphere, rather than on Sweden’s defence capa-
bilities. Although he recognises that the recent 
developments in Russia are alarming and that 
the rising frequency of Russian military exercis-
es in the region does indeed alter the security 
situation, Löfven does not consider Russia to 
be a direct military threat to Sweden. He does, 
however, prioritise developing national de-
fence capabilities over participation in foreign 
operations. The Green Party has oriented itself 
according to a broad definition of threats and 
challenges and its main objective is to promote 
peace globally – they see the Baltic Sea region 
as one of the most stable parts of the world. 
A similar position has been adopted by the Left 
Party, which believes that in the foreseeable fu-
ture, Sweden will not face a traditional military 
threat. However, this consensus on the threats 
and challenges perception has not translated 
into shared priorities in the area of national se-
curity and defence policy.
Differing priorities in security 
and defence policy
The differences in the perception of threats and 
challenges to Sweden’s security are reflected 
in the nature of the proposed changes to Swe-
den’s security policy, the way of developing ci-
vilian and military capabilities, and in the work 
on the defence budget.
Within the ruling coalition, the Moderates 
favour continuing the current policy of non-
aligned “solidarity” linked to close political 
and military cooperation between Sweden 
and NATO, and with the Nordic countries. They 
are also in favour of the reform of the Armed 
Forces currently underway, albeit with minor 
adjustments and with a slight increase in de-
fence spending. According to Prime Minister 
Reinfeldt, Sweden’s accession to NATO is not 
currently an option because of low support 
for this idea in parliament. Nonetheless, Stock-
holm’s close ties with NATO are important for 
maintaining stability and security in Europe 
and around the globe. On the other hand, the 
Swedish Liberals are in favour of joining NATO 
in 2020 and of modernising the armed forces 
to strengthen the country’s defence capabilities 
(including, its medium-range air defence). They 
also advocate a partial reintroduction of con-
scription and a significant increase in military 
spending. This view is shared by the Christian 
Democrats; their position on NATO membership 
is, however, less radical – they favour a careful 
analysis of the possible changes to Sweden’s se-
curity policy (including accession to NATO) and 
of their potential consequences for Sweden.
The opposition Social Democratic Party takes 
a position similar to that adopted by the rul-
ing Moderates, albeit with minor adjustments. 
Their priorities include Sweden retaining its 
non-aligned status (they do not mention soli-
darity with the other countries in the region, 
though), maintaining cooperation with NATO 
and the EU, close cooperation in the Nordic 
region, and a greater involvement in the work 
of the United Nations. Any adjustments to the 
current reform of the Armed Forces would be 
minor and probably limited to improving the 
recruitment and performance of civilian and 
military personnel. In a similar way to how the 
Moderates clash with their coalition partners, 
The Social Democrats focus primarily on 
social and economic security, rather than 
on military challenges.
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the Liberal Democrats and the Christian Dem-
ocrats, it is common to see the Social Demo-
crats in conflict with their own future coalition 
partners. However, both the Greens and the 
Left Party reject close cooperation with NATO 
(including, participation in NATO-led opera-
tions and in the NATO Response Force (NRF), 
and object to NATO exercises taking place in 
Sweden). They also oppose plans for NATO ac-
cession, albeit for substantially different rea-
sons – the Greens object to cooperating with 
a military alliance that pursues a policy of nucle-
ar deterrence, while the Left Party believes that 
Sweden will be able to shape its own security 
and defence policy and pursue its own priori-
ties more effectively outside NATO (and partly 
also outside the EU-led initiatives). The Greens 
are interested primarily in pursuing a policy of 
conflict prevention, and propose redirecting 
funds from the defence budget to civilian de-
velopment and crisis management organisa-
tions (which de facto would spell a substantial 
reduction in military spending). The Left Party, 
on the other hand, believes that the credibility 
of Sweden’s non-alignment policy is contingent 
on its strong ability to independently defend 
the country and on involvement in foreign op-
erations - as a consequence they are calling for 
a significant increase in the defence budget.
Sweden’s security policy 
after the 2014 election
Despite the recent debates in Sweden, the sim-
ilar positions of the two major parties - and po-
larised views of their smaller coalition partners 
- suggest that the country’s current security 
policy will continue in the next four years. The 
new government formed after the election to 
the Swedish parliament in September 2014 will 
most likely include the Social Democrats, the 
Greens, and the Left Party. Such a coalition will 
place emphasis on Sweden’s non-aligned sta-
tus and continue Stockholm’s cooperation with 
NATO (through the NRF, military exercises and, 
to a lesser extent, through joint operations) as 
well as develop cooperation with other Nordic 
countries. It is likely that Sweden will work most 
closely with Finland since the current Conserva-
tive government in Norway is more focused on 
developing closer ties with NATO, and has re-
cently withdrawn from several key armaments 
cooperation projects developed with Sweden. 
Within the EU, Sweden will advocate develop-
ing greater conflict prevention capabilities and 
emphasise the need for civilian CSDP operations. 
Sweden is also likely to become more active with-
in the framework of the United Nations; both at 
the political level (its objective being non-per-
manent membership in the UN Security Council 
in 2017-2018) and at the military level (increased 
participation in peacekeeping operations). The 
new government will also seek to reconcile Swe-
den’s military participation in crisis management 
operations with efforts to increase Sweden’s de-
fence capabilities; this may prove difficult with-
out a significant increase in defence spending.
Future military exercises by Russia are unlikely to 
be sufficient to radically change the stances of 
the Swedish parties on the direction of the coun-
try’s security and defence policy and to signifi-
cantly re-orient their focus to the Baltic Sea re-
gion. Instead of a top-down change - reliant on 
a shift in the positions held by political parties 
- the reorientation is more likely to stem from 
a bottom-up change in public opinion. Polls sug-
gest that the security debates in 2013 have had 
a big impact on Swedish society. According to 
an opinion poll conducted by the Swedish gov-
ernment agency MSB, the number of people in 
favour of Sweden joining NATO rose to 36% in 
2013  (from 30% in 2012), with 40% of respon-
The Social Democrats, the Greens, and the 
Left are expected to form the new govern-
ment and they will emphasise Sweden’s 
non-aligned status, maintain close ties 
with NATO and the Nordic states, and will 
be more active within the UN.
5OSW COMMENTARY   NUMBER 126
EDITORS: Olaf Osica, Anna Kwiatkowska-Drożdż, 
Katarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska 
TRANSLATION: Maciej Kędzierski  
CO-OPERATION: Nicholas Furnival
DTP: Bohdan Wędrychowski
The views expressed by the authors of the papers do not 
necessarily reflect the opinion of Polish authorities
Centre for Eastern Studies
Koszykowa 6a, 00-564 Warsaw
phone: +48 | 22 | 525 80 00
e-mail: info@osw.waw.pl
Visit our website: www.osw.waw.pl
dents opposing NATO membership (down from 
47% in 2012). At the same time, confidence in 
the government’s defence policy dropped to 
26% in 2013 (from 35% in 2012), while 52% of 
respondents had no confidence in defence poli-
cy pursued by the ruling coalition.
APPENDIX
Support for Sweden’s political parties in December 2013 
The parties of the ruling coalition
Moderates (m) - 25.5%
Centre Party (c) - 4.7%
Liberal People’s Party (fp) - 5.4%
Christian Democrats (kd) - 4.1%
The opposition parties
Social Democrats (s) - 34.3%
Green Party (mp) - 8.8%
Left Party (v) - 6.7%
Swedish Democrats (sd) - 9.3%
Other parties - 1.3%
Source: Radio Sweden, Red-green parties strong lead in polls, 4 December 2013, http://sverigesra-
dio.se/sida/gruppsida.aspx?programid=2054&grupp=20048&artikel=5723312
